

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE SECOND GULF WAR

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THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE SECOND GULF WAR

by Trevor Stewart

Shortly after the Second Gulf War, (SGW) or the war in Iraq in 2003, began, the administrations in both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) had between them set up several inquiries to investigate the intelligence, or evidence, that the governments were using to justify that war; and the final inquiry, called the Chilcot Report,¹ was commissioned to investigate the UK's involvement.

Named after Sir John Chilcot who led the public inquiry that made up the report, the report was published on July 6, 2016, after a 7-year wait, and had emerged out from the Chilcot Inquiry, or Iraq Inquiry, that was established on June 15, 2009, by Gordon Brown, the British prime minister and New Labour leader at that time.

Relative to the uranium-Niger intelligence claim that US intelligence were also in possession of and were also using in an attempt to secure justification for the war with Iraq I address separately from the UK's uranium claim---see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, however, I also refer to that intelligence throughout this article.

Relative to the Chilcot report, the source to this complicated narrative goes back much further than 2016 or 2009 with both Chilcot and Brown's inquiries and had emerged out from and prior to the attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. (9/11) And while that world-changing event is commonly referred to as "9/11", it was the critical event that preceded the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001; (operation: Enduring Freedom) the Patriot Act---brought out in the US on October 26, 2001; the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003; (operation: Shock and Awe) Extensions on the Patriot Act---new laws to monitor or spy on, among other nations, the US and Europe, and brought out in the US on May 26, 2011, under President Barack Obama---the first African-American president of the US and leader of the Democrat Party. Therefore, along with those above critical events and many other important historical subjects and peoples---for example: Osama Bin Laden and his alleged terrorist organisation of Al-Qaeda, this article will also investigate, along with many articles in many newspapers, the government inquiries that were commissioned to investigate the intelligence that led to the SGW in 2003. Therefore, the network within the network---the neocon-Trotskyite network that was in power in the US throughout most of the events referred to in this article, will be the starting point.

THE NEOCONS AND THE RAD DOCUMENT

To give some data on the background of the persons holding power in the US prior to and during and after the Iraq war in 2003, the neoconservatives (neocons) were a political-based group and movement founded in the 1960s that became the dominant force within American politics with the election of George W. Bush in 2001. Some of the older neocon members were connected to the famous 1930s New York Intellectual Movement that Leon Trotsky, or Leif Bronstein---one of the Bolshevik revolutionaries, had emerged from, therefore, due to those communist connections, many people came to regard the neocons as communists and Trotskyites. The neocons had not only thrown their full support behind the conflict-causing forced racial integration policies throughout the 1950s in the US, but were the exact same movement that founded the PNAC group---Project for the New American Century, and had written the RAD document---Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century.² The legendary RAD document became a major source for controversy shortly after the professional attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon in 2001, and I will now address the reasons for that.

Within the RAD document there is a handful of statements made that left many people speculating that the neocons had actually engineered the attacks on the WTC themselves---the so called "false flag" attack---to enact new laws at home and to wage war abroad. What follows is the original statements from the RAD document for you to read over and analyse, and is the source for that speculation; and if you remember to bear-in-mind what had actually followed their publication---the airborne attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon; the eternal War on Terror; the Patriot Act; the Afghan war; the Iraq war, and Extensions, then I'm sure you'll agree with me that both statements fit the description for the perfect conspiracy theory: (1) **"Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor"**; (2) **"fighting and winning of multiple, large-scale wars"**.

To clarify: (1) When they stated: **"new Pearl Harbor"**---Pearl Harbor was the US naval base that was heavily attacked by Japan during World War Two (WWII) in December 1941, I postulate they were referring to the terrorist attacks on the WTC in the US; (2) when they stated: **"transformation"** and **"fighting wars"**, I postulate they were referring to the Patriot Act; the Afghan war; the Iraq war; (3) when the

necons stated: **“even if it brings revolutionary change”**, I postulate that they fully understood that by moving to secure their objectives---regime change; Patriot Act, could lead to revolution in the US.

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE SGW

On 9/11 the media report that terrorists have attacked the WTC complex and the Pentagon with hijacked airliners, and a fourth hijacked airliner---a Boeing 757-200, that failed to reach its target due to passenger intervention, crashed in Shanksville, Ohio, killing all on board. It was the greatest act of terrorism the US has ever known; almost 3,000 US citizens lost their lives, and a world-changing event. The US later blamed Osama Bin Laden and his alleged terrorist organisation of Al-Qaeda for the attacks, however, Bin Laden, although he supported those responsible, denied any personal involvement. The US later went on to accuse the Taliban, who had won control over Afghanistan post-Soviet withdrawal in 1989, of harbouring Bin Laden and allowing Al-Qaeda to build and operate military bases in their nation. Later, and no doubt believing he was being set up, the Taliban offered that if the US can prove Bin Laden's guilt they will accordingly hand him over to a third party for trial. The US had previously made their case, and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (operation: Enduring Freedom) begins on October 7, 2001. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) control and fight a proxy war through the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.

EVIDENCE THAT LED TO THE SGW

What follows is predominantly from the UK's perspective on the intelligence that led to the SGW; for the US perspective, see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE.

From 2001 to 2003 the UK and US were pushing the United Nations (UN) to give a ruling on Iraq due to them believing Iraq was a major threat to their interests. In an attempt to win over the UN, the UK government---under the management of New Labour and Prime Minister Tony Blair at that time, had ordered UK intelligence to compile an assessment on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities that eventually became the September dossier, or, its actual technical name, Iraq's

Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government.³

The September dossier was published by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) on September 24, 2002, and had evolved out from the earlier drafts of a WMD paper⁴ that was first published in March 2002 by UK intelligence. The September dossier's intelligence, or the two critical claims held within, is as follows: (1) the 45 minutes claim---Hussein's "**military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons...**" "**Some of those weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.**"; (2) and the uranium from Africa claim---that Hussein "**sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa**" to use in his nuclear missiles, or WMD, programme. In addition to the September dossier, the JIC had compiled a later and further dossier on February 3, 2003, called the February Dossier, or, its technical name, Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation. From here on in the February dossier, that now held the intelligence files from the September dossier, now came to be known as the Iraq Dossier.⁵ Therefore the Iraq dossier now held the intelligence files that the UK and US would later depend on as they were making their cases for war on Iraq.

The JIC had further accusations claiming that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq was a threat to, among others, UK interests---British army bases in Cyprus; Israel, etc., by seeking to build WMDs. For an example of this, one JIC accusation states: that Iraq "**has recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme.**" Moreover, after the September dossier merged with the February dossier to become the Iraq dossier, Blair, in the foreword⁶ on the Iraq dossier, also made some statements prior to the SGW that's important enough for highlighting. Blair stated: "**We must ensure that he [Hussein] does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.**"

The above statements were taken from the September and Iraq dossiers. The foreword was written by Alastair Campbell---Blair's director of communications and strategies. They are important enough because, even at this early stage, while the Iraq dossier clearly stated: "**sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it**" what the sources stated regarding the UK's uranium-Africa claim---which is: "**Iraq had shown an interest in purchasing uranium from Niger but was not certain whether contracts had been signed off on or if the uranium had been delivered to Iraq**"---was far more than Blair and Bush would have you believe; in fact, it was a doubt that was almost entirely removed from their war speeches and intelligence files as they were making their cases for war---see: URANIUM FROM AFRICA.

Another UK government accusation, that Blair read in the House of Commons

(Commons) on March 18, 2003, 2 days prior to war and 1 day after Robin Cook--- the foreign secretary, resigned in protest to the war on March 17, 2003, states: **"It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability."**⁷

On and post-September dossier's completion and publication Blair relied on the above data during his Commons speech on September 24, 2002,⁸ and his March 18, 2003, speech. Bush depended on similar data during his speech on October, 7, 2002,⁹ in Ohio, and also the State of Union speech on January 28, 2003¹⁰---see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE. Secretary of State Colin Powel, during his speech to the UN's Security Council on February 5, 2003,¹¹ also relied on similar data.

What you have just read was the two critical pieces of intelligence that led to the SGW in 2003 and caused the deaths of, among others, approx. half a million Iraqis; 5.000 US soldiers; 200 British soldiers, and witnessed the issuing of the Patriot Act in the US. However, and shockingly so if you right now consider that the elites were attempting to justify a war through unsubstantiated claims, the claims held within the Iraq dossier and the 1999-2001 US uranium claim were criticised from the start.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE: URANIUM FROM AFRICA

THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATION

Just before the invasion of Iraq, an organisation called the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had probably not investigated the JIC's 2002 uranium claim in the Iraq dossier but certainly had investigated the US's uranium claim from 1999-2001. The head of the IAEA at that time---General Mohamed ElBaradei, presented his intelligence report¹² to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, regarding the uranium-Niger intelligence, and stated it was **"not authentic"**. ElBaradei wrote:

"With regard to uranium acquisition, the IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation

was centered on documents provided by a number of states that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.

The IAEA has discussed these reports with the governments of Iraq and Israel, both of which have denied that any such activity took place.

Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports.

The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the government of Niger and to compare the form, format, contents and signature of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded with the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which formed the basis for the report of recent uranium transaction between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.

There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990."

Therefore even if ElBaradei wasn't referring to the UK's 2002 uranium claim, the claim was still ruled out as **"not authentic"** by the IAEA.

It had taken a while for me to notice, but why didn't ElBaradie refer to the UK's 2002 uranium-Africa claim they were using in the September and Iraq dossiers? His report states **"1999-2001"**, however UK intelligence state they hadn't picked up their uranium-Niger intelligence claims until **"June and September 2002"**---see: THE SOURCES FOR THE URANIUM FROM AFRICA CLAIM. It's clear to see also, that although the September dossier's uranium intelligence was published on September 24, 2002, 6 months prior to ElBaradie's UN presentation on March, 7, 2003, the IAEA missed its publication and importance. Strange as that is, the inquiries also failed to address why that was. Moreover, ElBaradei also missed the UK's February 3, 2003, dossier---the Iraq Dossier, published 1 month prior to his UN report.

In conclusion: Although ElBaradei failed to acknowledge the uranium from Africa claim held within the UK's September and February dossiers---the Iraq dossier, the actual uranium claim being ruled out by ElBaradei did undoubtedly reflect badly on the UK's 2002 uranium from Africa intelligence claim also.

THE CIA'S INVESTIGATION

The following shows that both the US and UK governments were aware that the uranium intelligence was lacking credibility. In February (no date) 2002 the CIA---on behalf of the US Vice President Richard Cheney's office who were investigating the accusation that Iraq may have purchased or was trying to purchase uranium, also known as yellowcake ore, from Africa to use in its nuclear weapons programme in the late 1990s, sent one of their ex-CIA operators---the ex-US Ambassador Joseph Wilson, to Niger, in Africa, to investigate. After returning from his investigation---sanctioned by the CIA, in what was very likely to be March (no date) 2002, Wilson, in a retrospective piece that was first published on July 6, 2003, and called What I Didn't Find in Africa,¹³ wrote:

"Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A.

It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place. Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired."

In the same article Wilson went on to write:

"I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.

Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, [Iraq dossier] repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.

The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case."

On June 3, 2002, the Independent on Sunday---a UK newspaper, had reported Wilson as stating:

"That it was all but impossible that British intelligence had not received his report---drawn up by the CIA---which revealed that documents, purporting to show a deal between Iraq and the west African state of Niger, were forgeries."¹⁴

Undoubtedly he is, but If Wilson is accurate in his report then even before Blair's war speeches---September 24, 2002; March 18, 2003, and Bush's war speeches---October 7, 2002; January 28, 2003, the US and UK governments were aware that the uranium claim was false. Later---and this is another fine example of foulplay---

after the Iraq dossier was published and Wilson had read its claims, he reminded the governments---if it were the same claim---that the CIA had ruled it out. Later there was an attempt to discredit him, and it ended with his wife---Valerie Wilson, being named as the CIA officer who had asked Wilson to investigate the claim. However, due to Wilson's previous ties to Niger---Wilson was the ambassador, it appeared like the reasonable choice. Later, the leak that tried to discredit Wilson and his wife was traced to the Bush administration and ended with the conviction of I. Lewis Libby---Cheney's chief of staff, for perjury and obstruction of justice. Libby escaped prison due to a Presidential Pardon from Bush.

In conclusion: (1) It appears UK intelligence did receive the Wilson report; (2) the CIA assumed---as noted in the Wilson report---that the British intelligence---uranium from Africa, was the same intelligence that SISMI---Italian intelligence, had picked up---see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, for details.

Staying with the UK perspective. Clearly Wilson's (CIA) critical statements had to be investigated. Later---during the FASC (or FAC) inquiry that was set up on June 3, 2003, Straw---Blair's foreign secretary, was asked: **"What was the date on which the British intelligence were informed by the CIA that the forged documents existed?"** Straw answered the investigators: **"We will find out."**¹⁵

Although the date that UK intelligence received the CIA report---if they did---was undoubtedly of major importance to the inquiry, the FASC left the question there; Straw is yet to give an answer.

The FASC didn't provide a specific date to which Straw gave his answers, but it was more than likely to be in or around July 24 or 27, 2003. In addition, many of the sessions ("closed sessions") with Straw were held in private, and as far as I'm aware have yet to be viewed.

What you have just read was the IAEA and Wilson doubting the US's uranium from Niger claim. Because, however, the UK were using the same claim, the IAEA's findings reflected badly on the UK's uranium claim also. I will now look at what the Blair administration's *indirect reply was.

THE UK GOVERNMENT'S INDIRECT REPLY

Although the IAEA and Wilson had doubted the uranium claim, Blair, in June (no date) 2003---3 months after ElBaradei's IAEA's report; 3 months after Wilson was debriefed by the CIA, and during the House of Commons Liaison Committee inquiry, that was (HCLC) commissioned shortly after the SGW began---indirectly answered the implications of those statements made by the IAEA and the CIA by stating that the uranium data **"came from a separate source from the forged documents."**¹⁶

*Blair's statement at the HCLC inquiry was made in regards to the Iraq dossier's forged files that Rangwala had discovered.

The elites were content with Blair's answer, however, although it saved them in regards to Rangwala and the forged files in the Iraq dossier, the uranium claim was still ruled out. Later, Straw, during the FASC inquiry where he was questioned on more than likely around July 24 or 27, 2003, in regards to the CIA and the IAEA's doubts over the uranium claims, supported Blair by referring to "**other evidence, which was available**"¹⁷ that supports the uranium from Africa claim made in the Iraq dossier. In addition, as far as I'm aware they only first spoke of the "separate source" 5 months after Rangwala had exposed some of the Iraq dossier's files as forgeries. Additionally, Straw's "other evidence", as with Blair's "separate source", has never been investigated, or I couldn't locate any information to show if it has.

What follows is an investigation into the primary sources and the uranium from Africa intelligence they supplied UK intelligence with. However, the "other evidence", referred to by Straw during the FASC inquiry, isn't available for analysis.

THE SOURCES FOR THE URANIUM FROM AFRICA CLAIM

Both the sources were investigated by the House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee's (ISC) inquiry. (no dates) They questioned the head (no name) of the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) about where the uranium claims emerged from. The SIS stated they had received the intelligence in June (no dates) 2002 and late in September 2002 from two sources with two pieces of intelligence. The SIS stated: the sources were claiming that "**Iraq had shown an interest in purchasing uranium from Niger but weren't certain whether contracts had been signed off on or if the uranium had been delivered to Iraq.**"¹⁸

Based on the above: I concluded that the sources were more certain that Iraq had sought to obtain uranium, but less certain if Iraq had received it or not.

So that was the original combined statements the SIS had allegedly picked up that later made it into the Iraq dossier. However, if you compare it to the statements in the Iraq dossier and speeches---see below---then there's a problem: the parts of the statements that acknowledge the DOUBT were mostly removed from both Bush and Blair's war speeches and the dossiers as they were making their cases for war; all through their rhetoric and dossiers did they only once admit that the intelligence claims were inconclusive, or words to that effect; twice if you include the implicit one, underlined, along with the explicit one, in the forthcoming passages for clarity.

For an example of John Scarlett, Campbell, Straw, and Blair, who had all worked on the SGW project, pushing their doubts on the uranium from Africa intelligence to the side, here is the only acknowledgement to that doubt that I could find: (1) in the House of Commons on September 24, 2002, Blair stated: **"In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful."**¹⁹ (2) in the foreword on the dossiers Blair stated: **"We must ensure that he [Hussein] does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants."**²⁰

Bush also didn't refer to the doubts that the SIS's sources acknowledged during his presidential speech on January 28, 2003. Now depending on the UK's uranium-Africa intelligence, Bush stated: **"the British government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"**.²¹

Please also bear the above statements in mind when you now understand what the SIS's sources had actually stated: **"Iraq had shown an interest in purchasing uranium from Niger but was not certain whether contracts had been signed off on or if the uranium had been delivered to Iraq."**

In addition, here is the uranium claim statement taken from the Iraq dossier, and you can easily see how it was edited after it left the SIS's hands: Hussein **"sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it."**

While the elites had wrecked their own defence by editing out the doubts, there are more smoking guns I discovered during this study that point to foulplay; and this one---the SIS picking up their latest uranium intelligence around three months---see: Dates, below for evidence---after Wilson had ruled out the first uranium claim---the SISMI claim, was fortunate indeed and surely one of them. Dates: (1) Wilson was debriefed in March 2002; (2) the SIS picked up the uranium claim in June 2002.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE: THE DECLASSIFIED NIE FILES

Another piece of serious evidence that doubted the claims regarding the uranium from Africa is the National Intelligence Estimate's (NIE) intelligence files declassified by the CIA in July (no date) 2003 and June 1, 2004. The NIE's declassified files had revealed that the US Department of State, (DS) in October---no date---2002,²² and

before Bush's January 28, 2003, speech; Blair's March 18, 2003, speech, had ruled out the uranium from Niger intelligence as **"highly dubious"** due to French control over the Niger uranium industry. In addition, Bush made another speech---**"if Iraq is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."**---on October 7, 2002,²³ before his January 28, 2003, one, where he spoke on the uranium-Niger subject, however I failed to locate the month's date for when the DS file was written so can't be certain if it came before or after that speech.

Although the UK government inquiries had emerged after and around the same time as the NIE files were declassified and published by the CIA in the US, not one of them touched on that subject; they also mostly missed Wilson's CIA report---his debriefing report given in March 2002; Chilcot, whose own investigation didn't begin until 2009, must surely have been aware of the NIE files and Wilson's CIA report but did not acknowledge either.

Thanks to the NIE's declassified DS files and the Wilson report it is now to be understood that the Bush and Blair administrations were aware that US intelligence had ruled out the uranium intelligence as having no credibility before Bush's speech (and Blair's) on January 28, 2003, but---and this is the problem---the claim was still used in the speech, or, at least, the same claim but taken from an different source---the UK's Iraq dossier. The integrity of the Bush administration came under serious suspicion after that episode, and the responsibility for why that claim was included in the president's Ohio speech was, and unsurprisingly so, placed on the head of the director of the CIA---see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, for further details.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE: THE FORGED DOCUMENTS

Some parts of the UK's intelligence files held within the September dossier were found to be forgeries by a man called Glen Rangwala. Rangwala claimed that parts of the September dossier's intelligence had been plagiarised from various sources, and one of those sources was a student called Ibahim al-Marashi. It was Al-Marashi's security piece on Iraq he wrote---Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis,²⁴ that was later considered to be used under fraudulent circumstances by the UK government. Rangwala's findings were later supported by

Channel 4 News in the UK who broke the story to the public. It was shortly after the documents were exposed as forgeries that the September dossier became known as the “dodgy dossier” by parts of the UK media. It was important enough, and did reveal to the public that the elites were willing to borrow any old article that sounded similar to what they required and just changed the wording to suit their needs. For an example of those “alterations” made, Al-Marashi’s paper states: **“monitoring foreign embassies in Iraq”**, the Iraq dossier’s paper states: **“spying on foreign embassies in Iraq”**. The British government apologised for using Al-Marashi’s article without permission.

Please take note: According to Blair and the JIC, the UK’s uranium from Africa claim is written on a separate file from the forged files that Rangwala discovered; the UK’s forged files are apparently not the same forged files that SISMI turned over to the CIA and that Wilson and the IAEA had probably investigated then ruled out.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE: THE 45 MINUTES CLAIM

In addition to the uranium from Africa claim; the forged intelligence documents, as well as the fact that the JIC’s sources are anonymous, which hypothetically can leave room for corruption, the claim that Hussein’s **“military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons”**; **“Some of those weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them”** also became a source for controversy. I will now address those claims.

THE SOURCE FOR THE 45 MINUTES CLAIM

The September dossier evolved out from the early drafts of a WMD paper that was produced in March 2002 by UK intelligence. The files that held the 45 minutes claim were received by the SIS on August 30, 2002, from their Iraq source, where it was then passed on to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) who were in charge of the September dossier, now in its draft form. From there it was passed on to the JIC on September 10 or early September---the exact same time as General Pollari from SISMI allegedly passed the Italian’s uranium from Niger intelligence to Hadley in the US---see: THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, for details, and it was at this same time that the JIC became the managers of the intelligence that eventually became the September dossier. The 45 minutes intelligence claim was included in

the September 10, 2002, draft of the dossier; the September 16, 2002, draft of the dossier; the September 19, 2002, draft of the dossier, and, finally, the penultimate September 24, 2002, dossier---the September Dossier.

DR DAVID KELLY

At the proof-reading stage of the September dossier the 45 minutes accusation was objected to by Dr David Kelly---one of the weapons inspectors in Iraq, who had accused the New Labour hierarchy of manipulating the evidence in the dossier. The story goes: Before the September dossier was published to the general public and prior to the SGW, Kelly was working for the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) at the same time the JIC were compiling the September dossier. Kelly had proof-read the documents but began to criticise the 45 minutes claim. Kelly later whistleblowed to Andrew Gilligan---a BBC correspondent, that he believed the intelligence had been manipulated, or, in Kelly's own words, "**sexed up**", by Alastair Campbell---Blair's director of communications, who oversaw the construction of the intelligence by the JIC. Apparently several of Kelly's colleagues were also negative towards the 45 minutes claim, but were overruled by their high-command. Later---on July 1, 2003, Gilligan, writing in the Mail on Sunday newspaper, had explicitly accused Campbell of ordering its inclusion in the September dossier. This accusation got a reaction: and during the FASC inquiry that followed, Campbell and Gilligan were questioned by the investigators. In regards to the 45 minutes claim Gilligan stated: "**My source [Kelly] believed that that single source had made a mistake, that he had confused the deployment time for a conventional missile with the deployment time for a CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be fireable at 45 minutes notice. ... That original source of the 45 minute claim, he was the one that spoke about missiles.**"²⁵ In response to this serious accusation from Dr Kelly, the foreign secretary during that time---Straw, refuted Gilligan's accusations. Later---and this is another remarkable statement to have survived and to have come down to us---Straw actually went on to support Kelly's suspicions by informing the FASC inquiry that he also doubted the 45 minutes claim. He stated: "**I do not happen to regard the 45 minute statement [as] having the significance which has been attached to it, neither does anybody else,**..."²⁶ In effect, Straw had just shockingly removed the integrity from one of the critical pieces of intelligence that the government were using and relying on to justify the SGW. It was the same piece of evidence that Dr Kelly---the whistleblower who turned up dead, had refuted, and if no one believed it held significance then why was it included in the dossier in the first place?

THE FASC'S CONCLUSIONS

On July 7, 2003, the FASC published its conclusions: Campbell was cleared of ordering the insertion of the 45 minutes claim into the dossier; the FASC offered that the 45 minutes claim was given "**undue emphases**" by the JIC, and "**no evidence was found to back up the claim**" that "**some CBW weapons could be delivered to units within 45 minutes of an order being issued.**"²⁷

The FASC inquiry was commissioned to investigate, along with other claims, if the 45 minutes accusation was legitimate or not and who ordered its inclusion into the dossiers. The FASC accepted and concluded that the government's reason---which was: they believed the claims were justified so were left in the dossiers---for its inclusion in the intelligence dossiers was justified, and this is why its insertion into the September dossier was regarded not remotely as propaganda but merely as placing an "undue emphasis" on the evidence. In addition, being excluded, probably by the MoD, from questioning the commander of the JIC---Scarlet, about why he "**chose to give the 45 minutes claim such prominence**" didn't help the FASC inquiry and left me even more convinced that they lied their way into the war.

At the close of the FASC investigation: Scarlet was blamed for allowing the 45 minutes intelligence claim to remain in the September dossier; the politicians were admonished. However, to possibly honour Scarlet for silently taking all the blame without protest; protecting the politicians, which, of course, is standard operating procedure within the system the elites control the nations through, he, shortly after the FASC inquiry had concluded, was promoted to commander of the SIS.

Although Scarlet was left looking like the guilty party, the investigators missed a couple of glaring bits of obvious data: the 45 minutes claim---received by the SIS on August 30, 2002, from their Iraq source---passed through the hands of both the SIS and the FCO's intelligence agents before finding its way into Scarlet's hands at the JIC on September 10, 2002, when the JIC became managers of the project.

INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE: DISSENTING VOICES

During the compilation of the dossiers there were dissenting opinions in the UK's intelligence agencies that were concealed by the Ministry of Defence. (MoD)

During the ISC inquiry²⁸ investigators asked the head of the Secret Intelligence Service; (SIS) the Government Communications Headquarters, (GCHQ) and the

staff councillor---the commander of the UK intelligence agencies, if any of their intelligence officers had any concerns with the intelligence claims held in the Iraq dossier. In response to this questioning by the ISC investigators the SIS stated: **"To date, no complaint has been made or any other similar action taken by any member of staff."** However, because these agencies don't, at least at that time, keep each other informed, the ISC then had to ask Scarlet---the head of the JIC, if there had been any objections. Scarlet stated: **"none had"**. Eventually, apparently due also to loose communications, the ISC asked the MoD the same question. Questioned on July 22, 2003, the defence secretary confessed: **"there had been a dispute"**, and the MoD had received a minute informing them that there had been two dissenting voices within the Defence Intelligence Staff. (DIS) The dispute was concerning the 45 minutes claim. However, although I couldn't locate further data to clarify all that had unfolded, the fact that they were talking about the "DIS" and the "45 minutes claim" led me to believe they were referring to Dr Kelly.

UN RESOLUTION 1441

Some 3 months after the September dossier was published by the JIC the UN's Security Council published their final pre-war conclusion---resolution: 1441, on December 8, 2002.²⁹ The UN's conclusions were based on the intelligence reports taken from the weapons inspectors and the intelligence dossiers and, in fact, they did not provide legal authorisation for war---see: WAS THE WAR ILLEGAL?

The February dossier was published---February 3, 2003, after resolution 1441 was issued---December 8, 2002. However, Bush and Blair, after Jacques Chirac---president of France at that time, threatened to veto any second resolution they may seek, abandoned their attempts to secure a further UN resolution on Iraq.

The war the elites so needed---see: THE PATRIOT ACT---was beginning to fade away thanks to the UN's non-compliance through resolution 1441. So it was now that Blair, and probably after one or two rushed meetings with his freemason comrades (it's reported that Blair is a 33rd degree mason) sought legal council from the UK's attorney general for his interpretation of resolution 1441. Additionally, the US, 4 days prior to invasion, advised UN weapons inspection teams---under Hans Blix and General ElBaradie, who were still seeking evidence to back up the claims made in the Iraq dossier, to depart Iraq. Waiting on UN inspections teams locating WMDs, etc., was over. Bush now sought Senate approval for invasion.

EVIDENCE OF FOULPLAY

THE GOLDSMITH SHIFT

The UK and US were pressuring the UN to give a ruling on Iraq for some time now. Now, after the UN gave its final ruling, in which they did not give approval for war, Blair and Bush had a problem. They need this war for two important reasons, which I will write on a little later. So it was now that Blair sought council with the UK's attorney general---Lord Peter Goldsmith, to possibly persuade him to overrule the UN so the UK can assist the US---who were determined to remove Hussein through the aggressive act of "regime change" which they had previously written about in the controversial RAD document---in removing Hussein. Later---on March 7, 2003, and 13 days prior to invasion, Goldsmith had now completed his paper³⁰ that offered his opinion on if the war were legal or not.

It was at this point that Goldsmith himself added to the intrigue. Goldsmith wrote: **"The Iraq war was likely to be challenged under international law because of the lack of backing from the UN";** the **"safest legal course would be to secure a new resolution from the UN to justify war on Iraq."** or words to that effect.

Looking at Goldsmith's statements, we can clearly see that he believed any war with Iraq to be more than likely illegal outwith the sanction of the UN. However, I would argue he definitely believed it was illegal---see: WAS THE WAR ILLEGAL? However---and this is another fine example of what makes their attempts to justify going to war with Iraq appear suspicious---only 6 days after Goldsmith had advised Blair to secure a further resolution from the UN, on March 13 he published a further document³¹ now proclaiming a war on Iraq to be legal. It was a brutal pro-war shift, and we can safely speculate that Goldsmith was probably not acting under his own initiative but pressure must have been applied to him to reverse his first decision; in fact, it's alleged that on hearing Goldsmith's first advise Cabinet members ordered the Iraq dossier to be "burnt and destroyed".

Only seven days after Goldsmith had overruled the UN the US-led invasion of Iraq (operation: Shock and Awe) began on March 20, 2003, in search of WMDs, and, in the process, the elites would fulfil one of their objectives they had previously written about in the RAD document: "regime change".

THE MEMO FROM THE JIC

On June 26, 2011, The Observer---a British newspaper, printed an article about a memo³² sent from Scarlett---the commander of the JIC, to Blair's foreign affairs

adviser---Sir David Manning. This enlightening and ominous statement of intent, that came to the public's attention shortly after it was retrieved through the "freedom of information act", alluded to the sinister fact that the UK government were aware that Iraq's WMD capabilities were non-threatening. The controversial memo, sent from the commander of the JIC, shockingly states: **"the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of WMD Iraq is not that exceptional."** It doesn't take too much explaining, but just to spell it out in other words: they were hoping that by concealing the fact that Iraq's WMD threat is harmless to UK interests, it would help win over the public to the belief that war against Iraq is not only necessary but very much justified. This memo had unmistakably declared sincere intentions to defraud the soldiers; the public, and the people within Iraq, and I consider it to be one of the critical pieces of evidence that proved that the Blair administration were lying about Iraq's WMD capabilities so they could justify the SGW.

CHANGES TO THE FOREWORD

More evidence that points to foulplay emerged from the JIC's demands that the wording in the September dossier's foreword be changed.

After Campbell had completed writing the foreword on the dossier he then sent it to Scarlet at the JIC to sign off on before it went to print. Later Scarlet wrote back to Campbell asking him to make some changes to the foreword.

So---and you can review the original wording in the foreword on the Iraq dossier here: SOURCES 6---this was the move that showed how they attempted to plant the candlestick in Scarlet's JIC library; the changes to the foreword are as follows, and the words in bold show how the JIC successfully distanced themselves from ALL of the evidence to SOME of the evidence:

(1) Here is the original statement that was written by Campbell: "The document published today **is the work** of the Joint Intelligence Committee."

(2) Here is the changed statement: The document published today is based, **in large part**, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee".

To speculate on why Scarlet wanted those changes made in the foreword on the September dossier---the foreword on the September dossier was also included in the later Iraq dossier---can only ever lead to one obvious and negative conclusion: Scarlet's JIC agents didn't want to take the blame for the dodgy 45 minutes claim and the dodgy uranium from Africa claim being included in the dossier.

As far as I'm aware, although JIC intelligence officers demanded alterations to the foreword, they haven't emerged as whistleblowers and slated the government for using propaganda in an attempt to justify the SGW in 2003.

GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES INTO THE SECOND GULF WAR

Outwith the Hutton inquiry that was set up to investigate Dr Kelly's death, in the UK, after the US-led invasion of Iraq had begun, several government inquiries were set up to investigate if the war was justified or not. The following passages contain a lot of similar material to the rest of this article, so I will mostly only highlight some of the conclusions from the US and UK inquiries. See: SOURCES 50, for the SENATE IRAQ REPORT.

THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP

The Iraq Survey Group---(ISG) under the command of the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and set up to investigate Iraq's WMDs, concluded: (1) "Saddam ended his nuclear program in 1991. ISG found no evidence to restart the program, and Iraq's ability to restart a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after 1991"; (2) "Iraq had destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile in 1991"; (3) "Saddam [Iraq] abandoned its biological weapons program and its ambition to obtain advanced biological weapons in 1995. While it could have re-established an elementary Biological warfare program within weeks, ISG discovered no indications it was pursuing that course."

In conclusion: While Iraq was a reasonable threat to the international community pre-1995, the ISG ruled that Iraq did not have WMDs in 2003.³³

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIAISON COMMITTEE

After the invasion of Iraq had begun, another government inquiry was set up to investigate the evidence used in an attempt to justify the war. Relative to the forged files Rangwala discovered, at the House of Commons Liaison Committee inquiry (HCLC) Blair stated: although the September dossier is considered a forgery, the uranium claim "**came from a separate source**."³⁴ (Failed to locate HCLC files)

One of the critical things that had emerged from the HCLC inquiry: Although Blair agreed that some of the September dossier's documents were forgeries---see: THE FORGED DOCUMENTS, which, in itself, is an amazing omission, we can also see that the claim he made during that same inquiry---the uranium data "**came from a separate source**", appeared to have saved the UK's uranium claim relative to the forged files Rangwala had discovered, but, relative to the overall uranium claim,

alas, because that same claim was categorically ruled out twice prior to the SGW---by Wilson (CIA) and ElBaradie, (IAEA) the UK's uranium claim still lost its integrity.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

Set up on July 3, 2003, the FASC inquiry concluded: (1) that UK intelligence had placed on the 45 minutes intelligence claim an **"undue emphasis"**---CBWs over conventional weapons; (2) the uranium claim was inconclusive: the FASC require further data from Straw, or UK intelligence agencies; this hasn't been resolved.³⁵

THE BUTLER REVIEW

The Butler Review was commissioned on February 3, 2004; Butler's conclusions were published on July 14, 2004, and state: (1) "It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999, and the British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium." (2) "The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium, and the British Government did not claim this." (3) "The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it."³⁶

Regardless to Butler's conclusions---see below---when the ISG stated: **"Saddam ended his nuclear program in 1991. ISG found no evidence to restart the program"**, it undoubtedly contradicted Butler because number 1 is covered by the following description: **"ISG found no evidence to restart the program"**.

The important points to remember here are: (1) even if Hussein had sought to obtain uranium from Africa, it wasn't enough to warrant war; (2) all the uranium from Africa intelligence claims, be it the SISMI's or the UK's, was ruled out by, excluding Butler, several organisations---the CIA; the DS; the UN; the IAEA; the ISG, etc., and many government inquiries.

Butler's conclusions on the JIC's claims---"sought uranium from Africa"; "launch CBWs within 45 minutes", are: (1) **"Iraq's attempts to buy uranium from Niger are well-founded"**; (2) **"the JIC should not have included the '45 minute' report in its dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to."**

THE HUTTON INQUIRY

Starting at the FASC inquiry. Dr David Kelly---one of the weapons inspectors and the Gilligan source that accused Campbell of "sexing up" the September dossier, was a witness at the FASC inquiry and questioned on July 15, 2003. Kelly appeared anxious throughout that process; two days later, and shockingly so, it's alleged he

killed himself. Kelly's death left everyone shocked, and the Hutton Inquiry³⁷ was set up to investigate. In short, the Hutton inquiry---set up in August 1, 2003, and issued its conclusions on January 28, 2004, concluded that "**Kelly had taken his own life**", and cleared the government of exaggerating the claims. However, as with me, you may see a major problem with Hutton's logic, hence the anomaly, because most of the other investigations ruled that they did. Moreover, if Kelly was alone and left no suicide note when he died then surely Hutton is speculating. So, the fact that he didn't return an inconclusive verdict, more so if you also consider that Kelly was the whistleblower who debunked the JIC's 45 minutes claim, adds to the conspiracy.

THE CHILCOT REPORT

The Chilcot report³⁸ is a massive 12 volumes long; uses euphemistic language, but explicitly calls the process that led to the SGW a major disaster. Unfortunately, however, by Chilcot not calling it propaganda---see: 2---shows how subjective his report was. Chilcot states: (1) that "Saddam Hussein did not pose an urgent threat to British interest"; (2) that "intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction was presented with too much certainty"; (3) that "peaceful alternatives to war had not been exhausted"; (4) that "the UK and US had undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council"; (5) that "the process of identifying the legal basis [for war] was far from satisfactory"; (6) that "a war in 2003 was unnecessary."

CONCLUSIONS

DID THE BUSH AND BLAIR ADMINISTRATIONS LIE?

(1) Although ElBaradei's report to the UN's Security Council was accepted, it was accepted after both Bush and Blair, excluding Blair's March 18, 2003, speech, had made their public speeches. Due to that, and at least in regards to ElBaradei's UN report, Bush did not mislead the public; however, Blair, or rather those who wrote the March 18, 2003, speech that he read out, in my view had misled the public by not informing them about, among other elements of doubt, the Wilson (CIA) report; Dr Kelly's doubts, and the IAEA's report.

(2) When the US and UK governments were making their cases for war against Iraq in 2002 and 2003, both Bush and Blair, during their speeches accusing Hussein of being capable of launching WMDs within 45 minutes of an order to do so and attempting to secure uranium from Africa to use in his nuclear missile programme,

made the following statements: (A) During the State of the Union speech on January 28, 2003, President Bush made the following statement: **"The British government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."**; (B) in the House of Commons on September 24, 2002, Prime Minister Blair stated: **"the document [the September dossier] discloses that his [Saddam Hussein's] military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them"**; (C) in the Iraq foreword, Blair stated: **"We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants."**; (D) in the Commons on September 24, 2002, Blair stated: **"In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful."**; (E) in the House of Commons on March 18, 2003, Blair stated: **"It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability."**

The words in the above sentences that are underlined are the only references throughout all the speeches and in the Iraq dossier and foreword made by the governments that acknowledged the uncertainties surrounding the claims. To make matters worse, only once was explicit; once implicit.

It was a remarkable overuse of propaganda---removing the doubt to begin a war, and boldly stating: "the greatest fraud since 9//11 occurred is the Iraq dossier", is no loose exaggeration. Due to this imbalance, I regard it as pro-war propaganda.

(3) Straw made the following statement at the ISC inquiry in 2003: **"I do not regard the 45 minute statement [as] having the significance which has been attached to it..."** However, prior to battle he did not interject.

If we accept what he says is true, then it's hard to explain why it was included in the September and Iraq dossiers outwith propaganda reasons.

(4) The careless memo sent from the commander of the JIC---Scarlet, to Blair's foreign secretary was, without doubt, one of the UK's smoking guns. (and more than equal to Silverstein's Freudian slip---"pull it", statement regarding WTC7) Scarlet's memo shockingly states: **"the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of WMD Iraq is not that exceptional."** Effectively Scarlet was advising a member of the Blair administration to lie.

(5) Dr Kelly---who proofread the September dossier and accused Blair's director of communications and security---Campbell, of "sexing up" the dossier by inserting

the 45 minutes claim into the dossier, is more evidence that the JIC's "evidence" was propaganda; it's unlikely Kelly would say that unless he was certain.

(6) Wilson---the ex-CIA agent who was sent to Africa to investigate the uranium from Niger claim, stated: **"That it was all but impossible that British intelligence had not received his report---drawn up by the CIA---which revealed that documents, purporting to show a deal between Iraq and the west African state of Niger, were forgeries."**

Based on Wilson's above statement, it's only right to conclude that both the US and UK governments were more than likely aware that the uranium claim was ruled out, regardless to the source, and, shockingly so, still used it in their speeches.

(7) The NIE's declassified DS files, that had revealed serious objections from DS agents from October---no date---2002, was another excellent example of foulplay, and disclosed that the DS had dismissed the uranium intelligence claim as **"highly dubious"** even before Bush's January 28, 2003, speech; Blair's March 18, 2003, speech, and possibly even before Bush's October 7, 2002, Ohio speech, but I failed to locate the month's date for when the DS documents were written so can't be certain if it came before or after the Ohio speech.

(8) Apparently French intelligence had warned the US almost one year prior to Bush's January 28, 2003, speech that the uranium claim dating back to 1999 wasn't to be trusted. If that's true, then all the speeches, right up to the very last one made by Blair on March 18, 2003, just 2 days prior to the start of the Iraq war, should be viewed as suspicious---they all referred to the uranium claim.

(9) The changes to the foreword on the Iraq dossier the JIC agents demanded can only be regarded as JIC agents moving to disassociate themselves from the two critical claims held in the "dodgy dossier". So more indications of foulplay.

To conclude: Along with all of the evidence above that surely proves the elites were exaggerating the intelligence claims to start a war with Iraq, there was even more hard evidence to add to that guilty stack that everyone seems to have missed. First: although the sources were uncertain about the first critical piece of evidence---the uranium from Niger claim, that doubt was definitely not fully reflected in Bush and Blair's speeches or the intelligence dossiers as they were making their cases for war. Second: the second critical piece of intelligence held within the Iraq dossier---the 45 minutes claim, was a big lie from the very start, and easily lost all its integrity when Straw stated during the FASC investigation in 2003: **"I do not regard the 45 minute statement [as] having the significance which has been attached to it..."** In effect, the politicians had talked the public into the SGW devoid of hard evidence; fundamentally they were speculating, and I believe they were lying.

STRANGE OCCURRENCES

The Iraq affair led to some strange occurrences, and Dr Kelly---the whistleblower who accused the government of "sexing up" the intelligence only to turn up dead 2 days after being questioned at the FASC inquiry, is one of strangest. Not only did Kelly's death leave a mass of suspicions and intrigue behind, it reminded those of us who recalled MP Robin Cook who, in an environment where all were aware that the US elites wanted war at any cost---as quoted in the controversial RAD document: **"even if it brings revolution"**---stood up in the House of Commons on March 17, 2003, and resigned---Cook's speech³⁹---in protest to the SGW. Later---in 2005, it's alleged he died of a heart attack while out hillwalking in Scotland. Cook was the last of the three men---Cooper; Kelly; Cook, who were involved in politics and had died during the 9/11 to the end of the SGW period.

THE GOLDSMITH SHIFT

Believing the elites were up to no good to get the SGW started becomes even more apparent when we look at the moves Goldsmith made. He was so uncertain about the evidence on March 7, 2003---the exact same time as ElBaradie ruled out the uranium claim---that he cautioned Blair to secure a further UN resolution that gave legal justification for war. However, only 6 days later---March 13, he changed his mind and declared the case for war proven. There was no sufficient reason given to justify overruling the UN, and Chilcot, in his 2016 report, concurred by stating: **"identifying the legal basis [for war] was far from satisfactory".**

So what would Goldsmith's reasons for this change be? There was no evidence given to him which the UN hadn't viewed which made him change his opinion. We know that. He may have been pressurised into compliance, but has made no motion to support that speculation. Be that so, all he can claim would be the same reasons as the government offered: they suspected Iraq held WMDs; he could launch within 45 minutes of an order to do so, and had sought to obtain uranium from Africa.

WAS THE WAR ILLEGAL?

The SGW was clearly technically illegal. And why? We were signed up to and did not break UN charter at the time the elites overruled the UN to begin the SGW.

When both nations signed up to the UN charter in 1945 that legally bound both parties to obey future UN rulings, they had given away their legal right to make war on any nation. Breaking UN Security Council resolution 1441, therefore, is the act that makes the SGW illegal. Moreover, due to the fact that the claims held within the Iraq dossier weren't backed by evidence to justify war; in fact the claims were mere

speculations, moral justification being used as an argument to overrule UN Security Council resolution 1441 should then be ruled out. In addition, both the US and the UK did not yield all aspects of their national sovereignty to the UN at the time of their membership, only that element which was relative and critical to why the UN was founded in the first place: to give up their right to independently declare war on any given nation at any given time. In addition, Goldsmith, when issuing his pro-war conclusion, fully understood that the UK was signed up to the UN charter at the time the UK was seeking justification to invade Iraq, and this is why he cautioned Blair to secure a further resolution from the UN; he was very much aware that he didn't have the authority to declare war.

Outwith authorisation from the UN, the best move they could have made was to break their contract with the UN before they declared war on Hussein. In addition, although the US and UK governments overruled the UN, they remained on the UN's Permanent Security Council. (PS) The events surrounding the SGW also help make the UN---untrusted by many principally and ironically due to national sovereignty issues, appear independent. The SGW, then, in my view, was illegal.

ARE BUSH AND BLAIR WAR CRIMINALS?

Unless you are being framed for a crime you didn't commit, being prosecuted is and should be based on technical facts. Knowing that, Bush and Blair, and not very surprisingly so, are strongly protected from technical prosecution: Bush relied on the intelligence received from the JIC and received Senate approval for the war; Blair, undoubtedly believing Hussein was still a major threat to British interests even after the UN gave no authorisation for war through resolution 1441, sought legal advice from Goldsmith. So, in effect, Blair left the war-making decision with Lord Goldsmith. Having said that, due to the many pieces of evidence that undoubtedly painted a negative picture---as shown throughout this article: the elites were lying to the public and soldiers to begin a war with Iraq---collective responsibility should be applied. Therefore, because the UN did not provide authorisation for war and both Bush and Blair had engaged in war after that fact and also outwith breaking their contracts with the UN; because they did not have tangible evidence---their intelligence claims were mere speculations: unbacked by adequate evidence---to justify overruling the UN, it does, in my view, tend to make them all look like war criminals.

THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Before I deal with the American perspective I will clarify the intelligence that both the US and UK were in possession of from apparently independent sources showing that Iraq had tried and was trying to secure uranium from Niger, in Africa:

(1) The Bush administration had received the 1999-2001 uranium from Niger, or yellowcake powder, intelligence claim from Italian intelligence---SISMI, and also the 2002 uranium from Africa intelligence claim that came from the JIC in the UK.

(2) The Blair administration had received and then used the uranium from Africa intelligence that came from the September and Iraq dossiers via the JIC; the FOC; the SIS; the sources.

(3) The UK's 45 minutes intelligence claim---held within the Iraq dossier, wasn't used by the Bush administration.

Moving on to the American perspective. Searching for and piecing together all the available data relating to the Italian involvement didn't turn out so well; it was one dead link after the other and very limited in documentation. However, although I located enough data to reach a conclusion, the evidence to back up the following narratives haven't been absolutely proven but is probably how it played out.

THE SOURCE: SISMI INTELLIGENCE

An ex-Italian military intelligence agent---Rocco Martino, who was possibly even a double agent, apparently received the forged Italian documents---that concerned the uranium from Niger claim, from an Iraqi woman who was working in the Niger embassy. Martino then passed the files to General Nicolo Pollari---commander of Italy's military intelligence---SISMI, during that time. After Pollari was in possession of the uranium from Niger intelligence files, he met with the US Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) Stephen Hadley in Washington on September 9, 2002, where he then passed the files to him.

US INTELLIGENCE ISSUE WARNINGS

US intelligence must have taken some kind of interest in the Italian file because, soon after Pollari's meeting with Hadley in Washington on September 9, 2002, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued an intelligence document---Defense Intelligence Assessment: Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program,⁴⁰ in 2002 (no date) that out-lined Hussein's efforts to rebuild its nuclear weapons program including Iraq attempting to purchase uranium from Africa for his WMD program.

The DIA's assessment concluded: **"Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake."**

It hadn't taken the neocons---who wrote: they wanted "regime change", in the RAD document---long before they began to use the Italian file against Iraq, and here we see the US intelligence services accusing Iraq of violating UN law by trying to purchase nuclear materials to build WMDs. It was one accusation after the other, and on September 11, 2002, (one year after 9/11) the National Security Council's (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to ask for clearance to use the Italian intelligence in a speech that Bush was about to give to the public in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002. The CIA gave clearance. Bush stated: **"Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons." "If the Iraqi regime is able to buy uranium, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."**⁴¹

US intelligence had published many files regarding Iraq as a threat after Pollari met Hadley in Washington and presented to him the 1999-2001 uranium from Niger intelligence. However, after it was eventually doubted by the CIA, they abandoned the SISMI's claim and went with the UK's 2002 uranium claim---held within the Iraq dossier, instead. Hadley admitted this meeting with Pollari occurred, but denied they spoke about the uranium from Niger claim.

DID THE ELITES IN THE US HAVE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE WAS FLOWED PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 28, 2003, OR OCTOBER 7, 2002 SPEECH?

(1) ElBaradei presented his report to the UN on March 7, 2003, which stated: the **"1999-2001 uranium from Niger"** claim was **"not authentic"**. The speeches made by Bush were prior to ElBaradei's report, so, in regards to ElBaradei, he wasn't lying.

(2) During Bush's Cincinnati speech on October 7, 2002, he stated: **"If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."** Wilson's conclusions came before that speech but weren't acknowledged.

(3) During Bush's Union speech on January 28, 2003, he stated: **"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa"**. However, and shockingly so if you recall what the SIS stated the sources as saying---which was: **"Iraq had shown an interest in purchasing uranium from Niger but was not certain whether contracts had been signed off on or if the uranium had been delivered to Iraq"**---they hacked off the end of the sources' statements the following incriminating words: **"but was**

not certain whether contracts had been signed off on or if the uranium had been delivered to Iraq." Wilson's conclusions also came prior to that speech and also weren't acknowledged.

(4) In February and March 2002 Wilson---ex-CIA, investigated then ruled out the uranium-Niger files as forgeries, and in doing so proved that the CIA did have prior knowledge that the claim was false long before Bush's speeches were given. In addition, Wilson stating: **"That it was all but impossible that British intelligence had not received his report---drawn up by the CIA---which revealed that documents, purporting to show a deal between Iraq and the west African state of Niger, were forgeries."**, also looks bad for the UK government's evidence.

(5) 4 months after the Iraq war had began---in July (no date) 2003, the CIA had declassified an NIE file⁴² that documented how the US Department of State, (DS) in October---no date---2002, had investigated then ruled out as **"highly dubious"** the claim that Hussein was seeking to purchase uranium from Niger.

In conclusion: The CIA's declassified NIE's files, or DS files, and Wilson's report were the icebergs that sank their ship, and proved that the Bush administration were not only aware that the intelligence was flawed prior to the speech on October 7, 2002; January 28, 2003, but had used that claim in that same speech. In addition, they withheld the month's date for when the DS file was written so I can't be certain if they were aware that the uranium from Niger intelligence claim---excluding Wilson's CIA report---had been ruled out also before the speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 2002. If it came before the October 7, 2002, Ohio speech, then Bush stating: **"If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year"**, should also be viewed as propaganda.

The Bush administration had used the UK's uranium claim in the January 28, 2003, speech although it was ruled out by the CIA, I shall now address that issue.

HOW DID THE BAD INTELLIGENCE GET INTO BUSH'S SPEECH?

Queried on why the intelligence that was dismissed for having no credibility was included in the president's January 28, 2003, speech, the CIA stated it was an error made through non-malicious intent. The CIA issued some statements relating to this sinister miscalculation and stated: **"These sixteen words---The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, should never have been included."** in the president's speech.⁴³

So they were caught lying to the public, or using a claim that was ruled out by

the CIA, and this I would consider propaganda; and the following, and not much data on these subjects, is a brief version of what I believe actually happened.

In early October (no date) 2002, George Tenet---director of the CIA, contacted Hadley from the DNSA twice to ask him to remove all references relating to the uranium from Niger intelligence that was to be included in the president's speeches he was about to give on October 7, 2002 and January, 28, 2003. Tenet then sent another memo to the Whitehouse and to the US National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice. However, although they had undoubtedly received the memos, the uranium-Niger claim was still used in Bush's January 28, 2003, speech.

Because most of the investigations didn't release so much documentation for study, all I could piece together was that there was an inquiry in the US; it was led by the House Oversight Committee (HOC) who investigated why the uranium from Niger claim was allowed in the January 28, 2003, speech, and although Rice stated that **"she knew nothing about any doubts the CIA had raised about this claim prior to the 2003 State of the Union address"**,⁴⁴ she was, and shockingly so, contradicted by a high-ranking CIA officer---probably Tenet, who claimed she was informed that the allegation---sought uranium from Niger, was false prior to Bush's January 28, 2003, speech. Rice later blamed the CIA for the error, and Tenet---identical to the commander of the JIC---silently took the fall.

In conclusion: Although we have a CIA officer stating that Rice had known that the uranium from Niger intelligence was false and she still allowed its insertion into the president's speech, Tenet and the CIA took the fall. Rice was never investigated, but she later added to the conspiracy by disobeying a subpoena to give testimony at, what I believe to be, the HOC inquiry.

If the elites are working towards establishing a new world order, (NWO) and of course many believe they are, then you would expect them to muddle the narratives on the Iraq war inquiries if they were bending the rules. They did. Therefore, I would suspect the evidence, or what should have been the evidence, that embarrassed both NSA Rice and the Bush administration, would be, of course, Tenet's memo informing the politicians to remove all references to the uranium claim from the president's speeches; the DS's "highly dubious" statement that was first declassified in 2003 and also surely must have been known to the elites, but not to the public until June 2003 and after the SGW began; the critical report Wilson returned for the CIA in March 2002 should also have given cause for concern. The IAEA's UN report came after the "16 words" were ruled out.

So that was how the UK's uranium from Africa intelligence found its way into President's Bush's State of Union speech on January 28, 2003. However, and this is

important to note, although the controversial "16 words"---"**The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa**", are concerned with the same claim---the uranium from Africa claim, as the US claim, but came from a different source---the Iraq dossier, the CIA still ruled the UK's uranium from Africa claim out.

AL-QA'IDAH AND THE PATRIOT ACT

Politicians are said to be notorious liars. To remind you of their behaviour over the past several decades and since the end of the war in 1945: as the elites were engineering the centralisation of political powers in Europe through the European Parliament dictating to the European nations and peoples, they were concealing their true intentions behind economic organisations---ECSC; EEC; EC, proclaiming they would bring greater prosperity. However, unchecked migration---50 million migrants, mostly from eastern Europe from 1945 onwards and at the end of the Cold War in 1991, possibly migrated into the UK---was the disaster that followed their lies. So, as with then, the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, that were critical to the fake War on Terror tactic that the neocons had devised, were also based on lies.

The Bin Laden and Al-Qeada story begins around the same time as the Soviets (Russians) had invaded the nation of Afghanistan in 1979 to support the failing pro-Marxist regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, (DRA) and it played out during the Cold War years between East and West. Throughout that brutal conflict, Europeans controlled all sides and the Arabs suffered badly with casualties reaching up and into the 4 million mark; 10.000+ Soviets were also killed or lost. It was the start of the eternal war for Bin Laden who, along with his alleged organisation of Al-Qeada, was later set up by the CIA to take the blame for the attacks on the WTC on 9/11. So, to begin with, I will now address the CIA's connections to Bin Laden.

THE CIA CONNECTION

Although there is no evidence that directly connects the CIA to Bin Laden, there is more than enough evidence to prove that the CIA were seriously involved with the anti-Marxist forces---the Mujahideen, operating in Afghanistan during the Soviet-

Afghan war in 1979-1989. What follows is admitted by the CIA.

After several Islamic nations and the UN passed a resolution in 1980 protesting against the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Afghan soldiers were trained in Pakistan and China to meet that threat; and was predominantly paid for by the US and some Arabic nations. If the National Security Archives⁴⁵ (NSA) of the US is to be trusted then the CIA had funded military missions against the Soviets through operation Cyclone as part of their system to stop the spread of Communism during the Cold War years, and were operating covertly through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan who would then move the equipment and funds to the Afghan soldiers. By the mid-1980s, China; Pakistan; the UK, and the US, along with others, were supporting the Afghan soldiers fighting against the Soviets.

The Afghan Arabs were international Arabs---non-indigenous Afghanists. After receiving financial assistance from some Muslim and Asian nations they deployed to Afghanistan to challenge the DRA-held government that were backed by the Soviet-Marxists; Bin Laden had emerged out from that non-indigenous Afghan group.

In conclusion: Through operation Cyclone the CIA had supported the indigenous and non-indigenous Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets, and Bin Laden---a Saudi Arabian therefore a non-indigenous Afghan Arab, was operating alongside them therefore was supported indirectly by the CIA. There is no evidence that I've viewed to show a direct connection with the CIA to Bin Laden. And because he was only later named as a terrorist by the West, the CIA's indirect support to him during the Soviet-Afghan war shouldn't be viewed as suspicious. Bin Laden wasn't the CIA asset many believe he was; but a useful tool to be set up, along with his alleged organisation of Al-Qeada, for the events on 9/11.

Moving on. There are 3 definitions for the word Al-Qeada in the following sub-categories, and I have divided them into the following 3 categories: Al-Qeada-1; Al-Qeada-2; Al-Qeada-3. This section will now deal with Al-Qeada-1.

AL-QEADA-1: THE DATABASE

Robin Cook---the foreign secretary for the New Labour Party, (1997-2001) and the Leader of the House of Commons until he famously resigned in protest to the Iraq war on March 17, 2003, stated in The Guardian---a British newspaper, on July 8, 2005, that he believed:

"Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to

wage jihad against the Russian [Soviets] occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. Inexplicably, and with disastrous consequences, it never appears to have occurred to Washington that once Russia was out of the way, Bin Laden's organisation would turn its attention west."⁴⁶

It was a remarkable statement for an ex-Member of Parliament (MP) to make. However, while the CIA have denied they specifically supported Bin Laden before or during and after the Afghan-Soviet war, and there is no evidence to show they used the Islamic conference's database in the exact manner in which Cook claims---"**was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen**", Cook was correct about Al-Qeada being the database for the Islamic conference. Cook doesn't give the source to his narrative about the "database", but the genuine source more than likely was a French military intelligence agent called Pierre-Henry Bunel. Bunel had written an article in 2004,⁴⁷ prior to Cook's claims in 2005, concerning the origins of the illusory Al-Qeada:

"Islamic Bank for Development bought a new computerized system to cope with its accounting and communication requirements. It was decided to use a part of the system's memory to host the Islamic Conference's database. It was possible for the countries attending to access the database by telephone: an Intranet, in modern language. The governments of the member-countries as well as some of their embassies in the world were connected to that network. [According to a Pakistani major] the database was divided into two parts, the information file where the participants in the meetings could pick up and send information they needed, and the decision file where the decisions made during the previous sessions were recorded and stored. In Arabic, the files were called, 'Q eidaat il-Maaloomaat' and 'Q eidaat i-Taaleemaat.' Those two files were kept in one file called in Arabic 'Q eidaat ilmuti'aat' which is the exact translation of the English word database.

But the Arabs commonly used the short word Al Qaida which is the Arabic word for "base." The military air base of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is called 'q eida' 'riyadh al 'askariya.' Q eida means "a base" and "Al Qaida" means "the base."

"In the mid-1980s, Al Qaida was a database located in computer and dedicated to the communications of the Islamic Conference's secretariat. In the early 1990s, I was a military intelligence officer in the Headquarters [sic] of the French Rapid Action Force. Because of my skills in Arabic my job was also to translate a lot of faxes and letters seized or intercepted by our intelligence services... We often got intercepted material sent by Islamic networks operating from the UK or from Belgium. These documents contained directions sent to Islamic armed groups in Algeria or in France. The messages quoted the sources of statements to be exploited in the redaction of the tracts or leaflets, or to be introduced in video or tapes to be sent to the media. The most commonly quoted sources were the United Nations, the non-aligned countries, the UNHCR and... Al Qaida. Al Qaida remained the data base of the Islamic Conference.

Not all member countries of the Islamic Conference are 'rogue states' and many Islamic groups could pick up information from the databases. It was but natural for Osama Bin Laden to be connected to this network. He is a member of an important family in the banking and business world."

Because I couldn't locate any data that contradicted Bunel, the conclusion may reasonably be: Al-Qeada was the computer file or directory--the "database", or the "base", that hosted the mid-1980s Islamic conference---that concerned the Afghan-Soviet conflict, that was accessed by any one of the participating nations and their embassies involved.

In conclusion: While Cook was correct about the origins of Al-Qeada being the name of the database or file that hosted the Islamic conference in the mid-1980s, there's no evidence I've viewed to prove the Islamic conference's database held a list of Mujahideen agents as Cook claimed; in fact, it's more likely the database was accessed by Mujahideen leaders tracking any developments at the conference.

AL-QEADA-2: THE BASE

Al-Qeada was a military training site located somewhere within Afghanistan and was founded during the Soviet-Afghan War---1989-1999, by Brother Ebeida. Bin Laden, who deployed to Afghanistan to fight a Jihad---Holy War, against the Soviet-backed DRA government, no doubt probably trained at Ebeida's base. The evidence to support those conclusions can be found in an rare interview held with Bin Laden in October 2001, in which he stated:

Q: Intelligence says that you run a network in some 40 to 50 countries. There is information that al Qaeda is very influential and powerful. How much is al Qaeda dependent on Osama Bin Laden?

BIN LADEN: This has nothing to do with this poor servant of God, nor with the al Qaeda organization. We are the children of an Islamic nation whose leader is Mohammed.

We have one religion, one God, one book, one prophet, one nation. Our book teaches us to be brothers of a faith.

The name "al Qaeda" was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al Qaeda. And the name stayed. We speak about the conscience of the nation; we are the sons of the nation.⁴⁸

Evidently Bin Laden denied there's an organisation called Al-Qeada, and did not claim, at any point in his life, to be the commander of that military organisation. However, while he may have been lying, I doubt he was: firstly, almost all terrorists see themselves as freedom fighters so usually accept responsibility for their attacks; secondly, the evidence that suggests the attacks on 9/11 was an inside job---and if it were then that rules out Bin Laden as the villain---is plenty in number and more than worth having a brief look at.

9/11 ANOMALIES

---Here is a brief list of some of the anomalies and smoking guns that left many people believing that the assaults on the WTC and the Pentagon were a false flag attack: (1) WTC1; WTC2, and WTC7 undoubtedly collapsed in a method identical to controlled demolition, only the method deployed may have been non-conventional. The US government held an enquiry into how the buildings collapsed and concluded with a reasonable explanation, excluding WT7, that fits the pattern of collapse---those parts of the structures above the impact areas were of such a weight it caused the top parts of the buildings to collapse down on themselves and destroying in the process each level below---but, and this is the problem, NIST's theory on collapse also precisely fits the behaviour of steel buildings brought down through controlled demolition; (2) thermate---a product to cut through structural steel and associated to the demolition industry, was discovered at ground zero soon after the collapse; (3) Silverstein's "pull it" statement that may have been a major slip up; (4) the intriguing statements written in the RAD document by the anti-Stalinist; pro-Trotskyite neocon elites that had manifested soon after Bush came to power; (5) the structural damage done to the Pentagon in no way fits the government's claims that a Boeing 757-200 with two jet engines weighing around 1300 tons crashed into it: it left, before the wall collapsed, minor damage comparable to a missile strike. Those are but a handful of examples for why many people believe the attacks on 9/11 were a false flag, and why many believe Bin Laden wasn't responsible---

AL-QEADA-3: A CIA CONSTRUCT

I propose that the CIA invented the phantom organisation of Al-Qeada---if any terrorist events occur, even though it doesn't exist, they blame it on "al-qeada"---in a bid to give their War on Terror tactic maximum credibility. Al-Qeada was created as a cover for their own actions---9/11, and to secure two major critical objectives: (1) to create the appearance that a ruthless enemy---better known as Al-Qeada and Bin Laden, threatens the West; (2) to enact new laws---the Patriot Act, in the US to frustrate the citizens and to condition them into accepting a stronger police state.

AL-QEADA REDEFINED

Within this article there are 3 definitions for Al-Qeada:

(1) Al-Qeada-1 was the computer directory or file, which, in English, means the "base", or the "database", that hosted the Islamic conference---concerned with the Soviet-Afghan war, held in the mid-1980s;

(2) Al-Qeada-2 was the military training base created by Abu Ebeida and used

by the indigenous and non-indigenous Mujahideen soldiers---Arabs and Asians, in their war against the occupying forces of the Soviet-Marxists;

(3) Al-Qeada-3, or what that word once innocently represented: the database for the Islamic conference; the military base founded (no date) by Brother Ebeida, was misappropriated by the CIA to present a name to the phantom organisation of their number one terrorist: Bin Laden, accused of the attacks on September 11.

THE PATRIOT ACT

It's frightening to think your government are accused of carrying out false flag attacks so they can bring out new laws in your nations, but it's very probable they do; it works like this: If the elites require new laws to strengthen their police state what should they do? Well, they can fabricate their own terrorist organisation---in this case Al-Qeada, to carry out the missions and attacks themselves then blame the organisation they had just invented.

Do you believe the elites when they tell you we went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq to regime change because Bin Laden; the Taliban, and Hussein were pure and simply evil and possibly held WMDs with the intention of deploying them against Western interests, or was it all a great lie and a smokescreen to justify bringing out the Patriot Act⁴⁹ in the US? Creating an environment of international terror to justify new and unpopular laws in the US wasn't the only factor involved, of course, and greater security for Israel (founded in 1947) surely must also have been a major factor. The Patriot Act was the primary objective, of course, and no doubt to help win their wars they are engaged in and have been engaged in in most nations, not only the US, for well-over the past *1700 years. Today the Patriot Act views all Americans as potential suspects. For an example of the Patriot Act's illogical therefore sinister intentions---similar laws enacted in Europe, or the EU, of course---although terrorism is definitely and factually not the primary sport of white Americans, white Americans are searched and treated as potential suspects when going through their own customs in their own airports in their own nations. Moreover, sinister as it were to enact the hated Patriot Act shortly after the neocons arose to power in 2001 under President Bush and shortly after the RAD document was written and the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, in 2011 the US government, then under the control of President Obama and the Democrats, added Extensions to the Patriot Act. Those Extensions now gave the US government the legal right to permanently spy on the people; monitor their computer and Internet activities; listen in on their hardline and wireless telephone communication; snoop on their business records and even the books they may borrow from the library. Unfortunately for us they undoubtedly did all

that and more even before Extensions were added in 2011.

Does it sound like the governments are engaged in an actual covert war against their own citizens? Was the Patriot Act and the war against the Arabs the true purpose behind the RAD document; 9/11; the War on Terror; the 2001 Afghanistan war, and the 2003 Iraq war? I believe it was.

---*The elites---the aristocratic royal and political ruling and upper classes, can be traced back to the Roman emperors so are descended from ancient bloodline networks that date back thousands of years. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands---one of the founders of the Bilderberg Group and blood-related to Queen Victoria, descends from the House of Orange; the Black Nobility---Slavic; the House of David through the Merovingians, and also descends from the Habsburgs who themselves descend from Frederick III---the last Roman emperor. Please bear-in-mind that the Europeans---the great white race, or the Cro-Magnon race, that entered into Europe around 40,000BC, have been roaming the planet since long before the founding of Rome in 753BC.---

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS & INTERESTING FACTS

(1) The transcripts from the Italian inquiry are written in the Italian language and, as far as I could ascertain, haven't been interpreted into English. The Italian inquiry was commissioned to investigate Martino and Pollari's---agents from SISMI military intelligence, involvement in the uranium from Niger forgeries. And although Martino admitted passing on the forgeries---later used then dismissed by the CIA, this critical line of inquiry, excluding the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) inquiry---failed to locate transcripts---that returned no prosecutions, was ignored by both US and UK government inquiries.

(2) Foreign Secretary Straw failed to give an answer at the FASC inquiry as to when UK intelligence received the Wilson (CIA) report, or if they had received the report. Chilcot, as with the other inquiries, failed to pursue this issue.

(3) The facts surrounding the uranium intelligence appear somewhat confused. To straighten that out, here is more data on that subject: **(A)** SISMI had passed the uranium from Niger intelligence to the CIA on numerous occasions prior to the SGW;

(B) later the CIA published their first uranium-Niger report---Iraq: Nuclear Related Procurement Efforts---failed to locate the NRPE file---on October 18, 2001; (C) 7 months later---May 10, 2002, the CIA, after qualifying their status on Hussein's WMD programmes, apparently stated: "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from Niger." (D) on July 22, 2002, the US Department of Energy (DOE) published an intelligence document---failed to locate the DOE file---stating that "Iraq may be restarting its nuclear programme"; (E) in early September 2002, and before the UK September dossier was published and possibly just prior to the SIS picking up their own uranium intelligence claims around September 2002, the CIA had again received intelligence from SISMI regarding the uranium from Niger; (F) SISMI picked up the uranium from Niger intelligence claim through Martino---an ex-spy, and also a major controversial figure; (G) in February 2002 Wilson---ex-CIA, investigated the 1999-2001 uranium claim then ruled it out; (H) the DS---this is the "highly dubious" comment that was hidden from public view---in early October 2002 had investigated the 1999-2001 uranium from Niger intelligence claim then ruled it out. It's likely the DS's "highly dubious" claim had evolved out from Wilson's March 2002 report; (I) the IAEA (ElBaradie) investigated the 1999-2001 uranium-Niger claim then presented their findings to the UN on March 7, 2003, ruling the uranium claim, along with other claims, out; (J) before the Bush administration was running with the UK's uranium from Niger claim---used in the January 28, 2003, speech; "the 16 words", they were using the September 2002 uranium from Niger intelligence claim that came from SISMI. However, SISMI had presented that exact same intelligence possibly 3 times before the CIA and the DS had dismissed it; (K) the final time the US received any uranium intelligence reports from SISMI was in September 2002 and referred to the 1999-2001 claims; (L) after the SISMI claim that the US were running with was ruled out, UK intelligence---the SIS, picked up further intelligence on the uranium: June 2002; September 2002.

So that was the chronology on the uranium from Niger intelligence, but there are many problems: ElBaradie not investigating the Iraq dossier's claims regarding the uranium is a major problem because while the September dossier was published on September 24, 2002, ElBaradie made his UN presentation on March 7, 2003. So why did the IAEA not investigate the UK's 2002 uranium intelligence? The IAEA had approximately 6 months to investigate the September 24, 2002, claims held within the Iraq dossier; approximately 1 month to investigate the exact same claim held within the February 3, 2003, dossier, but did not acknowledge either. Strange as that is and regardless to that oversight, because the uranium claim was ruled out, those rulings did undoubtedly reflect negatively on the UK's uranium claim also.

(4) Many government documents concerning the Iraq war inquiries are readily available to the public, however I failed to locate documentation on the following subjects: the HCLC inquiry; the ISC inquiry; the DOE's report; the CIA's NRPE report; Scarlet's memo he e-mailed to Manning concerning Iraq's WMD capabilities;

(5) The date for when the US State Department had written the "highly dubious" comment should prove important regarding the Cincinnati, Ohio, speech on October 7, 2002, by Bush, where he talked about uranium---see: SOURCES 41, to read the president's complete speech. Wilson's CIA report will also further damage the Bush administration, in respect to the Ohio speech; in fact, all the war speeches because this doubt---on the uranium, failed to be reflected in any of them, including Blair's.

(6) The declassified NIE files were only disclosed to the public approximately 4 and 15 months after the start of the war in Iraq: the NIE files, or the DS files, were declassified by the CIA in July (no date) 2003, and later, due to a request from the NSA, on June 1, 2004; the Iraq war began on March, 20, 2003. Previous to the July 2003 Second Release and the June 2004 Third Release by the CIA, there was a White Paper, or a First Release,⁵¹ published on October 3, 2002. This CIA White Paper failed to acknowledge---if the DS's "highly dubious" statement was written before October 3, 2002---the DS's doubts over the uranium from Niger intelligence. The CIA's White Paper (Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs) also failed to acknowledge Wilson's March 2002 conclusions.

(7) Because I was unable to locate the memo sent from Scarlet to Manning so I could substantiate the context, I relied on the context---negative, that The Observer newspaper placed it in.

(8) General Pollari---from SISM, which is Italian intelligence, apparently assisted the CIA in the abduction of an Arabic cleric, who was sent to Egypt for torture. Pollari was prosecuted for this, but had his sentence commuted.

(9) To reiterate a critical fact already dealt with in this article; also please bear-in-mind that both the following intelligence claims were ruled out, looking at both the sources statements regarding the controversial two critical accusation can only ever lead to the conclusion that it was fundamentally based on a speculation. In effect, and to reinterpret without the loss of context: **Hussein possibly sought to obtain uranium; Hussein possibly can launch WMDs within 45 minutes of an order**, was the best of the "evidence" on offer to justify the SGW, and this is why the UN failed to provide authorisation for the invasion of Iraq through resolution 1441.

(10) Kofi Annan---the UN's secretary general, stated: "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of view [the UN's] and from the charter point of view it was illegal."⁵²

(11) Although both the US and UK governments failed to adequately prove that Hussein had sought or had purchased uranium from Niger or held and could deploy WMDs---chemical and biological weapons, (CBWs) within 45 minutes of the order to launch, Hussein was undoubtedly an aggressive leader. Therefore Bush and Blair were correct to regard him as such. What now follows is my edited research on Hussein's CBWs and behaviour: (A) according to the ISG, pre-1995 Hussein held CBWs; (B) Iraq's Kurds were oppressed by Hussein's government; (C) from my perspective, without good reason Hussein invaded Iraq's neighbour state---Kuwait, starting the 1990-1991 First Gulf War; (FGW) (operation: Desert Shield) (D) during the FGW Hussein attacked Israel with WMDs---chemical weapons. (Scud missiles)

(12) Based on the above consensus data, Bush and Blair were correct to regard Hussein as dangerous and aggressive. However---and this was their fatal error---by not remaining true to their fundamental suspicions---for example, if they had avoided the use of propaganda and left it here: **We suspect Hussein illegally possesses WMDs or is seeking---by attempting to purchase uranium, to obtain them; we suspect Hussein can launch WMDs or CBWs within 45 minutes of an order to launch, therefore we shall invade to negate that potential threat**---they possibly may have avoided the many inquiries that had emerged post-war. Therefore, using propaganda in an attempt to justify the SGW was their downfall with the people who understood that along with the rest of the claims the two critical claims held within the Iraq dossier were in fact unsubstantiated speculations, and claims backed with unsubstantiated evidence isn't even almost good enough to use to justify overruling the UN. In effect, the speculations became the evidence.

So both claims weren't supported with hard evidence, e.g., uranium samples or CBW samples, or anything considered worthy to be called WMD. And even today---2017, the governments---US; UK, have yet to produce any evidence that supports the claims made in the September and February dossiers---the Iraq dossier, back in September 24, 2002, and February 03, 2003.

(13) A small handful of the more sophisticated newspapers did refer to some of the subjects referred to in this article, but weren't as precise or helpful as they may have been; there were many technical problems---similar to the problems I observed when reading government documents related to the Iraq war inquiries, in respect to chronology; dates; sources, so a confused narrative.

(14) Although the claims made within the Iraq dossier have long since been ruled out by, among others, the Iraq Survey Group and many government inquiries, both Bush and Blair stand behind their belief that Hussein: (1) was a major threat, and the intelligence reflected that threat; (2) was in breach of UN resolution 1441.

(15) Hussein held WMDs prior to 1995, according to the ISG. But did he possess WMDs in the run up to invasion? Difficult to tell. Certainly the weapons inspectors were permitted to investigate any site in Iraq they so wanted, but they still didn't find anything good enough to be called WMD; however, Iraq being such a large nation it would not be impossible to conceal them, or even the raw materials that produces them, if he had them. In effect, the governments were damned if they didn't; damned if they do: the governments need to invade Iraq to search for any evidence that may justify that very invasion! In addition, after both the US and UK followed that above dangerous procedure and battle in Iraq had drawn to a close, no WMD's were ever recovered for use as evidence to support the governments' case.

(16) Hans Blix---weapons inspector in Iraq, stated: "Some people maintain that Iraq was legal. I am of the firm view that it was an illegal war".⁵³

(17) So why would Dr Kelly kill himself with tablets and knife? The only answer I could come up with is: pressure over having to attend the FASC inquiry. In effect, Hutton is asking people to accept that the pressure Kelly had over having to attend the FASC inquiry far outweighed the pressure he had over killing himself.

(18) It was a US-led campaign against Iraq; Britain's role was merely supportive. However, the UK's drive to prove the SGW was justified was every bit as equal to that of the US's.

THE IRAQ DOSSIER'S INTELLIGENCE

"As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: ● continued to produce chemical and biological agents; ● military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; ● command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai); ● developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents; ● pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes; ●

tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; ● sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it; ● recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme; ● illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads; ● started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; ● started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; ● constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel; ● pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles; ● learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors."

To end this article: Stopping Hussein, who the western governments claim was a brutal dictator determined to destroy us with his WMDs, or CBWs, or maybe he was, if he has them; if he can obtain uranium for his nuclear missiles programme, wasn't the critical concern of the elites in power throughout those events, but was a neat strategy to strengthen---through the implementation of their new laws written in the Patriot Act in 2001; Extensions on the Patriot Act in 2011, their long established police state and to further the transition from apparently democratic nations into the full-blown dictatorships that George Orwell had warned about back in 1948 shortly after WWII drew to a close. Have no more doubts about it, empowering their high-tech security network with new intrusive laws was the critical reason for why they were exaggerating the intelligence in the Iraq dossier; for why they were permitting ruled out intelligence claims to be included in their war speeches; for why they were concealing evidence that doubted elements of their intelligence, and wasn't about stopping terrorism; helping the citizens within Iraq; protecting the men and woman of our armed forces or the white race.

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An article I read after completing this article had revealed a "SECRET PLEDGE TO PROTECT THE U.S. AT THE IRAQ INQUIRY". Released by Wikileaks, the full article can be located at SOURCES 54.

TREVOR STEWART

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE SECOND GULF WAR
24/02/2017